The Coercion of Women in Divorce Settlement Negotiations by Bryan, Penelope Eileen
Denver Law Review 
Volume 74 
Issue 4 Symposium on Coercion - An 
Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, 
Exploitation, and the Law 
Article 5 
January 2021 
The Coercion of Women in Divorce Settlement Negotiations 
Penelope Eileen Bryan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Penelope Eileen Bryan, The Coercion of Women in Divorce Settlement Negotiations, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 
931 (1997). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital 
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
THE COERCION OF WOMEN IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT
NEGOTIATIONS
PENELOPE EILEEN BRYAN*
This essay addresses contextual coercion (or, in Alan Wertheimer's terms,
unfair background conditions') in divorce settlement negotiations. I argue that
psychological, social, practical and legal impediments create a hostile environ-
ment in which many divorcing wives bargain. As a result of these unfair back-
ground conditions, many wives enter divorce settlement agreements that fail to
provide them and their children with adequate financial support. Some wives
seek relief from these unfair divorce settlements and move to have them vacat-
ed on grounds of coercion, duress, misrepresentation, and unconscionability.
These contract doctrines, and the particular spin that family law places on
them, generally fail to comprehend or to take seriously the disadvantages
confronting many women in settlement negotiations. Rather, as written and as
applied, these doctrines frequently confirm, rather than correct, unfair results.
Consider first the financial context in which divorcing wives must bar-
gain.2 Generally the wife and the children are dependent upon the husband.3
Until a court orders temporary support, husbands frequently refuse to provide
child support and/or maintenance. The wife then has difficulty meeting her
basic needs and those of her children. Unless the wife or her lawyer obtains
an order for temporary support and the husband complies with that order, the
wife's financial situation can become desperate, increasing her willingness to
accept a poor settlement. On the streets, this tactic is called "starving her
out.",
4
The wife's low or non-existent income also makes it difficult for her to
pay attorneys' fees. Many wives proceed without lawyers5 or agree to joint
representation by lawyers their husbands have chosen.6 A wife who seeks a
lawyer sometimes cannot find one willing to represent her. Lawyers know that
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.S., Rollins College,
1978; J.D., University of Florida, 1981; M.A. (Sociology), University of Florida, 1989.
1. Alan Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, 74 DENv U. L. REV. 889, 901
(1997).
2. When I speak of women and their experiences, of course, I speak in statistical gener-
alities that may not apply to all women.
3. Approximately fifty percent of American wives earn no income because they do not
participate in the labor force. Most wives who do work outside the home earn substantially less
income than their husbands. Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the
Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 441, 449-50 (1992).
4. For description of a case where the husband employed this tactic, see Penelope E. Bryan,
Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAiM. L.Q. 177, 177-88
(1994).
5. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Broday, 628 N.E.2d 790 (Il. App. Ct. 1993).
6. See In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902 (I11. App. Ct. 1986).
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wives frequently cannot pay their fees and that courts commonly refuse to
order husbands to pay wives' legal fees. Many lawyers, particularly expensive
lawyers, admit that they prefer to represent husbands because they know that
husbands can pay their fees. Even when both spouses can afford attorneys, the
wife is likely to hire the less expensive and less competent lawyer.7
The wife's inadequate financial resources frequently prevent her from
conducting her case in a manner that protects her interests. In order for the
wife to determine the extent and the value of the marital assets, expensive
discovery must occur and valuation experts must be retained.8 Moreover, de-
pendent persons generally perceive their benefactors as benevolent, and a
wife's naive trust of her husband may encourage her to assume that she will
not need her own lawyer and that her husband will treat her fairly at divorce.9
The roles each spouse played during the marriage and their respective spheres
of authority within the marriage' ° can exacerbate the problems created by the
wife's financial dependency.
While some couples today exhibit egalitarian attitudes about marriage, the
traditional division of labor within the family seems quite intractable. More
wives than ever now participate in the workfor~e and share the burden of
providing for the family. Yet husbands still exercise greater control over mari-
tal decisionmaking, particularly important financial decisions. When a husband
has exercised authority over financial issues, the wife may accept his defini-
tion and valuation of the marital property rather than require verification by an
expert, particularly if she lacks the resources to hire an expert. The wife also
may lack the knowledge needed for successful financial negotiations. The
husband may even conceal" or deliberately undervalue assets, "2 relying up-
on her ignorance.
Moreover, despite egalitarian attitudes, wives still retain primary responsi-
bility for homemaking and child-rearing.'3 The wife's acceptance of this role
is secured through her socialization as a caregiver and through the validation
7. Bryan, supra note 4.
8. Cases challenging settlement agreements provide many examples of wives and/or their
attorneys failing to conduct any discovery at all. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Broday, 628 N.E.2d
at 795.
9. Id.
10. Sex role ideologies prescribe spheres of influence and appropriate behavior for marital
partners. Currently these ideologies range from egalitarian/modern to traditional. Modern beliefs
about sex roles prescribe equality between spouses. Egalitarian couples share decision-making and
family roles. Traditional sex role ideology, however, contemplates a marital partnership in which
husbands dominate and each spouse has distinct roles. Husbands are the primary providers, while
wives nurture and attend to relationships within the family. These separate roles impart primary
authority over important financial issues to the husband, and primary influence over decisions
relating to children and family care to the wife. See Bryan, supra note 3.
11. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Frederick, 451 N.E.2d 612 (El. App. Ct. 1991); Bellow v.
Bellow, 352 N.E.2d 427 (111. App. Ct. 1976).
12. See In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
13. VICTOR FucHs, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALIrY 72 (1988). Fuchs concludes
that women's disproportionate responsibility for child care provides the most powerful explanation
of the difference in men and women's earnings. Id. at 62. Although the gap between men and
women's wages closed by 7% between 1980 and 1986, Fuchs explains that the improvement
largely was due to the increased percentage of women workers who were born after 1946 and had
fewer children. Id. at 65-66.
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she receives from her husband and children, and from society, for behaving in
conformity with unspoken expectations of self-sacrifice and service. The im-
portance the wife places on her care-giving role encourages her to place great-
er value on having custody of the. children than does the husband. A loss of
custody not only would unacceptably alter her relationship with the children
but also would violate her sense of self. A divorcing mother, then, may be
inclined to accept an unfair financial agreement if her husband threatens a
custody dispute.'4 The wife's meager financial resources may make her fear
of losing custody all the more salient, for she may know that she cannot, and
that he can, hire attorneys and experts.
Many psychological factors predispose wives more than husbands to ac-
cept unfair settlement offers. For instance, wives suffer more from depression
than do husbands; wives generally have less status than their husbands; wom-
en use less assertive (and less effective) conflict resolution styles than do men;
women have lower self-esteem than men; women expect less than men do;
and women fear achieving, particularly when their achievement generates dis-
approval from the men upon whom they have been dependent. Each of these
factors causes wives significant problems in divorce negotiations. 5
Many wives suffer abuse from their husbands. 6 Typically a batterer ex-
ercises control over every aspect of his victim's life; her beliefs, her values,
and her body as well as her access to family, friends, employment, and mon-
ey." The problems created by this extensive control are enhanced by other
common characteristics of abused spouses: risk aversion, guilt grounded in
traditional beliefs about family responsibilities, low self-esteem, low expecta-
tions, depression, and passivity.' When these factors are coupled with the
terror experienced by many battered spouses at the mere mention of their
tormentors, the extreme disadvantage of abused spouses in divorce negotia-
tions becomes clear. An abused spouse may want to obtain her divorce with-
out making any requests for property or maintenance that will ruffle his feath-
ers-trading, in essence, her life for their assets.
Divorce laws contribute to these inequitable background conditions. As
the wife exits the marriage in which her care-giving and self-sacrifices were
endorsed and encouraged, law recasts her experiences in terms of a masculine
market ideology-an ideology that comprehends the world through lenses of
autonomy, self-interest, formal equality and individualism. The sacrifices she
made in the market in order to fulfill her caregiving obligations, the expendi-
14. Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of
Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 168 (1984).
15. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 457-81 (1992).
16. Estimates of the frequency of wife beating range from one-third to one half of all mar-
riages. M. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENcE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 31
(1980); Laurie Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 39, 41
(1981).
17. Karla Fischer et a., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic
Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2120-32 (1993).
18. For various discussions of these problems, see LENORE WALKER, THE BATrERED WOM-
AN (1979); LENORE WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984); Fischer, supra note 17,
at 2118, 2165-71.
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tures she made of herself, are incomprehensible in a world framed by these
concepts. 9 The fiction of formal equality obscures her compromised position
in the labor market, her continuing care-giving responsibilities, her prior in-
vestment in the family, and her need of assistance. Her continued financial de-
pendency is discounted by an individualism that respects her husband's ability
to leave, unencumbered by continuing responsibilities to her. The brutality of
the transition from family to law and the market stuns and confuses many
wives, leaving them ill-equipped to fend for themselves during divorce negoti-
ations.
A closer examination of the substantive law and its operation clarifies this
point. First, custody decisions are governed by the best interests of the child
standard. A typical statute lists ten or twelve factors that should be taken into
account in determining what custody/visitation arrangement best serves a
child's interest. At first blush, this standard appears friendly to a parent who
has invested substantial time in child care. The indeterminacy and the
politicization of *the standard, however, threaten rather than support a caring
mother.
The "best interests of the child" standard is §o indeterminate as to be no
standard at all. Many have noted the lack of guidance the standard gives to
negotiating parties, the wide discretion it creates for trial court judges, and the
advantage it provides to the wealthier spouse, usually the husband, who can
hire the better credentialed and more persuasive experts.' Moreover, during
the past decade, fathers' groups have employed the rhetoric of formal equality
to press for legislation expressing a preference for joint custody and a pre-
sumption that divorced children benefit from substantial and continued contact
with both parents.
An indeterminate standard grounded in formal equality does not reward a
mother who has invested substantially more time in the children than the fa-
ther. The mother's lack of a solid legal entitlement weakens her position in
custody negotiations and makes her reluctant to push for fairness in financial
negotiations for fear of provoking a custody contest.2'
Spousal maintenance law creates a similar problem. As with child custody
statutes, maintenance statutes typically list numerous factors a court should
19. Martha Fmeman argues that egalitarian ideology has helped to neuter motherhood by
devaluing and making invisible the caretaking function that mothers typically perform. MARTHA
ALBERTSON FNEmAN, THE NEUrERED MOTHER, THE SExUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTfirH
CENTURY TRAGEDmS 68 (1995).
20. See. e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC
AND REALITY OF DIvORCE REFORM (1991); David N. Bolocofsky, Use and Abuse of Mental
Health Experts in Child Custody Determinations, 7 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 203 (1991) (stating that in a
survey of lawyers, judges, and mental health professionals, over 70% thought the "best interests of
the child" standard was unclear); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custo-
dy Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984); Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights
in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1523, 1533 (1994); Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in
the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975).
21. Perversely, the worse the father's performance as a parent during the marriage, the more
the mother may desire custody in order to protect the children, and the more vulnerable she may
become to financial manipulation.
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consider in determining whether and how much spousal maintenance to award.
The indeterminacy of the statutes and the inconsistency in judicial opinions
weaken a wife's ability to negotiate for maintenance. She cannot, for instance,
realistically threaten to go to trial and obtain a maintenance award if her hus-
band balks during negotiations.'
The rhetoric of formal equality that pervades divorce law further weakens
a wife's claim for maintenance.23 Thinking of women as equivalent to men
suggests that they are able to care for themselves as men do. Moreover, it
implies that they can behave as men do and compete successfully in the job
market. This formal and gendered idea of equality ignores the fact that women
generally receive less pay than men for the same or equally valuable work;24
that women have more difficulty than men in securing suitable employment;
25
that motherhood inevitably constrains women's marketplace participation
26
especially when women must parent alone after divorce;' that spousal main-
tenance may be necessary for women to begin to achieve actual equality with
men; and that society continues to demand that women fulfill the bulk of our
collective responsibility for caregiving.
Belying women's worlds, equality rhetoric supports the perception that
22. See In re Marriage of Flynn, 597 N.E.2d 709 (1ll. App. CL 1992) (describing a 67-year-
old wife with poor health who agreed to waive her maintenance rights primarily because she be-
lieved it was the best she could do under the circumstances). Only between 10% and 17% of all
divorcing wives receive any spousal maintenance whatever. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD
SUPPORT AND AUMONY: 1987, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-23, NO. 167. (1990)
(stating that in a 1988 Census survey 17% of the divorced women reported that their divorce
decree entitled them to spousal maintenance); LENORE J. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTnON:
THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA 167 (1985); Terry J. Arendell, Women and the Economics of Divorce in the Contempo-
rary United States, 13 SIGNS 121, 133 (1987); Claire L'Heureux-Dube, Economic Consequences
of Divorce: A View From Canada, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 451, 485 (1994) (stating that in Canada
during 1990 only 16% of women requested spousal maintenance upon divorce and only 19% of
custodial mothers requested spousal maintenance). Custodial mothers with dependent children re-
ceive maintenance less than one-third of the time. E.g., Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Di-
vorce: Changing Rules, Changing Results, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 84 (Stephen
D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) (stating that in New York in 1984 only 24% of di-
vorced mothers with custody were awarded spousal maintenance); E. MACCOBY & R. MNOOKIN,
DIVIDING THE CHILD 123 (1992) (stating that a California study found that alimony was awarded
in 30% of cases in which the divorcing couple had at least one child under the age of 16). Even
when wives do obtain maintenance, the awards are small and for short durations.
23. See generally FINEMAN, supra note 20 (noting that the use of "rule" or formal equality
rhetoric in divorce reform has compromised the position of many women on economic and cust-
ody issues).
24. Terry J. Arendell, Women and the Economics of Divorce in the Contemporary United
States, 13 SIGNS 121, 129-30 (1987).
25. Qualified women also have more difficulty than qualified men in achieving deserved
promotion. See WErTzmAN, supra note 22, at 323-56.
26. FINEMAN, supra note 19, at 25-27, nn.23-24. As Professor Fineman notes: "[A] primary
focus now is on women as economic actors, a role that requires a degree of independence that is
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the demands of 'traditional motherhood.'" FINEMAN,
supra note 19, at 68. See also Arendell, supra note 24, at 124-25, 128-29; Mary Corcoran et al.,
The Economic Fortunes of Women and Children: Lessons from the Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics, 10 SIGNS 232, 234 (1984).
27. See generally FINEMAN, supra note 20, at 5; WErrZMAN, supra note 22, at 355-56 (stat-
ing that the presence of children in the divorced woman's household depresses her opportunities
for economic betterment).
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women need only small amounts of short-term maintenance or none at all.
Furthermore, the idea that spouses (husbands) have the right to leave their
marriages unencumbered by obligations to their prior spouses (wives) finds
expression in the law's current preference for a "clean break" at divorce.
The "clean break" rationale favors the use of property distribution, rather
than maintenance, to achieve financial equity between spouses.' Marital
property in most states is subject to equitable distribution. Again we encounter
statutory indeterminacy, and the predictable result is that wives generally re-
ceive fewer marital assets than husbands. 9 Moreover, even if marital assets
were equally divided, equality once again would mask inequity.
Under current definitions of marital property,"3 most divorcing couples
have little property to distribute. The marital property of a couple married for
many years generally consists only of equity in a marital home.3 In addition,
today's more expansive definition of marital property stops short of embracing
a spouse's enhanced earning capacity.3' A spouse's enhanced earning capaci-
ty, however, frequently is the most valuable financial resource in a marriage.
Excluding it from marital property, particularly when maintenance is
disfavored and infrequent, skews the distributiorl at divorce.3 Consequently,
under current distribution laws, a wife, at the extreme, may be entitled to half
of the value of limited assets. Formal equality again masks inequity.
Representation by an attorney does little to level this uneven playing field.
Like judges and legislators, lawyers are steeped in the ideologies of law, the
market, and patriarchy that ignore the positions of women and undervalue the
caregiving work women perform in the family.' In addition, many lawyers
are incompetent or they incompetently represent some clients. Many attorneys
dabble in divorce cases only when more desirable cases are lacking. Some
unimpressive solo practitioners "specialize" in divorces because desirable
clients go elsewhere, and the steady stream of divorce clients pays the bills.
Only within the past two decades, as attorneys began to recognize the financial
28. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Flynn, 597 N.E.2d 709 (Il. App. Ct. 1992).
29. See, e.g., WErrzMAN, supra note 22, at 106-07; KAREN WINNER, DIVORCED FROM JUs-
ICE: THE ABUSE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN BY DIVORCE LAWYERS AND JUDGES 41-42 (1996).
30. Nearly every state defines as marital all property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage with the exception of property obtained by gift or through inheritance. J. Thomas
Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (1992) (reviewing DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). During the
past several decades most jurisdictions have expanded their definition of marital property to en-
compass property titled solely in one spouse's name, Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouces and Strangers:
Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. LJ. 2303, 2314 (1994), pension and retire-
ment plans, id. at 2318, goodwill of businesses, William A. Reppy, Jr., Major Events in the Evo-
lution of American Property Law and Their Import to Equitable Distribution States, 23 FAM. L.Q.
163, 183-84 (1989), and, in a few jurisdictions, increased value of separate assets, for example,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(4) (1996). Under extreme circumstances a few states allow judges
to award the separate property of one spouse to the other spouse upon divorce. Robert J. Levy, An
Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 FAM. L.Q. 147, 156 (1989).
31. WEITZMAN, supra note 22, at 66, 78-79.
32. Arendell, supra note 24, at 131-32.
33. WErrZMAN, supra note 22, at 66, 78-79.
34. See, e.g., PHYLus CHELER, MomERs ON TRIAL: THE BATLE FOR CHILDREN AND
CUSTODY 198-208 (1987) (describing lawyers' gender bias against women in custody disputes).
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potential of divorce law, have high quality law firms specializing in divorce
become common. These firms, however, generally handle only a few wealthy
clients, and many of these clients are husbands.35
The wife's inadequate financial resources encourage attorneys to forego
needed discovery,36 to invest inadequate time in case preparation," to ne-
glect their clients' cases,3" and ultimately to encourage their women clients to
accept poor agreements.39 The wife frequently cannot resist her attorney's
pressure to settle.' Put simply, the context of divorce practice far too fre-
quently invites the wife's attorney to compromise the wife's interests during
settlement negotiations and to encourage the wife to accept a poor deal.
If the wife enters an unfair settlement, judicial oversight could, but does
not, provide relief. At the final hearing most jurisdictions impose a duty on the
judge to review a divorce agreement for fairness or lack of unconscionabili-
ty.4' Currently, however, for many reasons,42 judges pay only cursory atten-
tion to the actual provisions of divorce agreements.43 Since judges routinely
fail in this task, the only option available to a wife who has entered an unfair
agreement is to petition the court to set aside or vacate the agreement.
Many wives lack the financial and emotional resources needed to bring
such a challenge. Those who do must confront hostile judges and insensitive
legal doctrine. Because the context in which divorce settlements are negotiated
is tilted against most wives, courts should listen sympathetically to women's
35. I know a wealthy lawyer who lives in a town of about 75,000 and who recently filed for
divorce. Before choosing his lawyer, he interviewed every law firm in his area known to special-
ize in divorce. During the interviews he provided enough facts about his finances and the marriage
to assure that none of these firms could represent his wife without a conflict of interest. He is not
the first wealthy man I have known to employ this tactic.
36. In many cases where the wife's attempts to vacate a prior divorce judgment that incorpo-
rated a property settlement agreement, the lack of discovery by the wife's lawyer is apparent One
must assume either that all of these lawyers are incompetent, and/or that their clients lacked the
resources with which to pursue discovery.
37. Bryan, supra note 4, at 177-88 (recalling the story of a lawyer's failure to conduct dis-
covery, leading to an inequitable settlement).
38. See WINNER, supra note 29, at 71-92.
39. In Beattie v. Beattie, 368 N.E.2d 178, 179-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), for example, the hus-
band and wife met with the husband's attorney the day before final hearing. The husband's attor-
ney called an attorney to represent the wife. That attorney came to the husband's attorney's office
the same afternoon and met with his client, the husband, and the husband's attorney. While there
he reviewed with the wife a divorce agreement that already had been prepared. At no time prior to
walking to the courthouse with her the next day did the wife's attorney talk privately with her. Id.
40. WINER, supra note 29, at 91 (1996).
41. Sally Burnett Sharp, Semantics as Jurisprudence: The Elevation of Form Over Substance
in the Treatment of Separation Agreements in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 319, 322 & n.14
(1991).
42. Judicial frustration with the costs of litigation, Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cas-
es Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlement, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1350 (1994);
judicial deference to family privacy, see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); and judicial distaste for divorce cases, see, for example,
James Delaney, How to Bring Legal Sanity to Domestic Relations, 2 FAM. ADVOCATE 20, 20
(1980); Linda K. Girdner, Adjudication and Mediation: A Comparison of Custody Decision-Mak-
ing Processes Involving Third Persons, 8 J. DIVORCE, Spring/Summer 1985, at 33, encourage
judges to uphold questionably procured or unfair settlement agreements.
43. Marygold S. Melli et al., The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the
Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUToERs L. REV. 1133, 1145 (1988).
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complaints of duress and coercion and should look with great suspicion upon
agreements with unfair provisions. In fact, many courts do maintain that the
freedom of the parties to contract should be restricted in divorce because of
the important public policies at stake. The state, say the courts, should guard
against unconscionability in the substance" and against fraud, duress, and
undue influence in the making4' of divorce agreements.
Despite this lofty rhetoric, courts are very reluctant to set aside divorce
agreements.' Some of this reluctance can be explained by the failure of mas-
culine legal standards, imbedded as they are in liberal, market, and patriarchal
ideology, to capture the experience of women.
The law of the State of Illinois provides an example of how courts ad-
dress petitions to set aside or vacate property settlements. In support of the
State's policy of favoring settlement of divorce disputes, the Illinois courts
have created a presumption in favor of the validity of settlement
agreements.47 An Illinois statute specifies that a court cannot set aside or va-
cate a divorce settlement unless the court finds the agreement unconsciona-
ble.' In making this determination, the courts employ a concept of uncon-
scionability taken directly from Illinois commercial law.49 An unconscionable
agreement must be extremely one-sided or oppressive, an agreement "which
no man, not under delusion, would make, on the one hand, and which no fair
and honest man would accept, on the other." The courts use a two part test
to determine unconscionability. They inquire into (1) the conditions under
which the agreement was made, and (2) the resulting economic circumstances
of the parties.5 Claims of duress, coercion, and fraud fall under the first
prong of the unconscionability test. These claims must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence,52 and the evidence must establish an absence of mean-
44. See, e.g., McIntosh v. McIntosh, 328 S.E.2d 600, 602 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that
courts throw a "cloak of protection" around agreements negotiated between husband and wife to
ensure their fairness).
45. Sharp, supra note 41, at 327 n.42.
46. Id. at 329 n.50.
47. See In re Marriage of Riedy, 474 N.E.2d 28, 30 (IIl. App. Ct 1985); Bickson v.
Bickson, 183 N.E.2d 16 (II. App. CL 1962).
48. The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act provides:
The terms of the agreement, except those providing for the support, custody and visita-
tion of children, are binding upon the court unless it finds, after considering the econom-
ic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties,
on their own motion or on request of the court, that the agreement is unconscionable.
750 Il. Comp. Stat. 5/502(b) (West 1993).
49. See In re Marriage of Foster, 451 N.E.2d 915 (iII. App. Ct. 1983).
50. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gurin, 571 N.E.2d 857, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); In re Mar-
riage of Kloster, 469 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ill. App. CL 1984).
51. See In re Marriage of Foster, 451 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
52. See In re Marriage of Broday, 628 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that a claim
of fraud requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant intentionally misstated or con-
cealed a material fact which he had a duty to disclose and upon which the plaintiff detrimentally
relied); In re Marriage of Carlson, 428 N.E.2d 1005 (1]1. App. Ct. 1981) (stating that evidence of
coercion, fraud, or duress must be clear and convincing); Beattie v. Beattie, 368 N.E.2d 178 (111.
App. Ct. 1977) (stating that a party seeking set aside must prove by clear and convincing evidence




ingful choice. As should be obvious, the unconscionability standard is difficult
to satisfy and it anticipates none of the problems wives commonly encounter
in negotiating divorce agreements. Unsurprisingly, wives' claims of unconscio-
nability usually fail.
Consider one court's insensitivity to a mother's fear of losing custody. In
August of 1994, Yolanda left her husband, Jeffrey, after nearly twenty years
of marriage." She took their three youngest sons with her to the couple's
summer home. The older two boys stayed with their father in Bolingbrook,
Illinois. Jeffrey worked as a hospital administrator, earning approximately
$150,000 per year. Yolanda had not worked outside the home during the mar-
riage. The court soon ordered Jeffrey to pay to Yolanda $ 2,400 per month for
unallocated family support.5 '
Sometime within the first year after separation, Yolanda decided to move
to Wixom, Michigan with the three youngest sons. On August 28, 1995,
Jeffrey filed an emergency petition requesting the court to enjoin Yolanda
from permanently removing the boys to Michigan. A hearing was scheduled
for three days later. On the date of the hearing, Jeffrey, his lawyer, Yolanda,
and her attorney appeared at the court. For two hours they all negotiated in the
hallway outside the courtroom. Apparently, no discovery had been conducted
prior to negotiations. At her attorney's urging, Yolanda orally agreed to accept
what appears to be between seventeen and twenty-three percent of the marital
assets55 and three years of minimal and non-modifiable rehabilitative spousal
maintenance,56 in return for custody of her three youngest sons." Rather
than argue the merits of Jeffrey's emergency petition at the hearing, Jeffrey,
Yolanda, and their lawyers presented the terms of an oral settlement agree-
ment to the trial court. On the basis of the testimony, the judge agreed to enter
judgment on October 5, 1995.
On October 5, Yolanda appeared in court with her new lawyer, Mr. Hold-
en. Mr. Holden requested a continuance, but the court declined and entered
judgment. On November 5, Yolanda filed a motion to vacate the judgment,
arguing, among other things, that she suffered from duress during negotiations
because of her extreme fear of losing her children.58 Yolanda's fear seems
credible because she already had lost her two older sons to Jeffrey, the court
might have disapproved of her removal of the three youngest sons to Michi-
gan, she had only three days notice of the emergency hearing, and she had
minimal financial resources with which to fight Jeffrey. Moreover, the unfair
financial terms to which she agreed themselves suggest that her fear impaired
her ability to exercise her free will-she felt she had no other choice.59 The
53. In re Marriage of Steadman, 670 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996).
54. Id. at 1148.
55. Id. at 1149.
56. Id. at 1151-52.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. At the settlement hearing, Yolanda testified as follows:
MR. KOZLOWSKI [Counsel for Wife]: And that's the agreement we worked out today
in the hall, and we will reduce it to writing with the joint custody [agreement], and
you're satisfied with that?
1997]
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trial court, however, denied Yolanda's motion to vacate and the appellate court
affirmed. In addressing Yolanda's duress argument the appellate court stated:
Wife bears the burden of showing duress by presenting clear and
convincing evidence that she was bereft of the quality of mind neces-
sary to make a contract. While wife's fear that she may lose custody
of her children no doubt caused her anxiety, we do not recognize this
as a factor impairing her ability to exercise her free will and make a
meaningful choice when the record reflects that she agreed to negotia-
tions, took part in the negotiations and then presented the substance
of these negotiations, under oath, to the trial court. Many spouses
may experience anxiety when appearing in court because of a petition
to dissolve a marriage and this anxiety is no doubt heightened when
one fears she may lose custody of her children; however, this factor,
without more, does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that one
lacked the ability to make a voluntary decision.'
CONCLUSION
Unfair background conditions and insensitive legal standards create the
coercive context in which wives bargain at divorce. Understandably, many
wives agree to inequitable divorce settlements. If a wife challenges an unfair
settlement she confronts a policy favoring settlement, a presumption in favor
of the agreement's validity, a hostile legal standard, and a heightened burden
of proof. Employing these standards, courts usually refuse wives' petitions to
vacate unfair settlements, leaving wives financially devastated and embittered.
Commercial contract doctrine should not govern the validity of divorce
agreements. Alternatively, legal standards should be developed that anticipate
the common problems wives face during divorce negotiations. Moreover,
judges should receive education on the harsh realities of divorcing wives and
should not hesitate to vacate inequitable divorce agreements.
THE WITNESS [Wife]: I have no choice.,
THE COURT: Well, ma'am, I want you to understand that you do have a choice. We
can sit down right now and have a formal hearing and the parties can present
evidence on both sides and call any witnesses that you want and the Court will make a
decision.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: The question I have is, is this your agreement?
THE WITNESS: At this time, yes, sir.
Id. at 1149 (alteration in original).
60. Id. at 1151-52 (citations omitted).
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